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ABSTRACT 
Lower prices produce higher demand… or do they? A bank’s direct marketing to holders of 
―free‖ checking accounts shows that a large discount on 60% APR overdrafts reduces 
overdraft usage, especially when bundled with a discount on debit card or auto-debit 
transactions. In contrast, messages mentioning overdraft availability without mentioning 
price increase usage. Neither change persists long after the messages stop. These results do 
not square easily with classical models of consumer choice and firm competition. Instead 
they support behavioral models where consumers underestimate and are inattentive to 
overdraft costs, and firms respond by shrouding overdraft prices in equilibrium. 
Many business models in financial services and other industries rely on expensive add-ons 
that are tied to base goods. Examples include expensive overdraft credit (add-on) tied to a 
―free‖ checking account (base good), back-end management fees tied to ―free‖ investment 
advice, printer cartridges and printers, luggage fees and airline tickets, and dealer-supplied 
maintenance and automobiles. A closely related practice is overage/penalty pricing. 
                                                          
*
 Contact information: Sule Alan: salan@essex.ac.uk, University of Essex and Koc University; 
Mehmet Cemalcılar: mcemalcilar@ku.edu.tr, Koc University; Corresponding author - Dean Karlan: 
dean.karlan@yale.edu, Yale University, IPA, J-PAL, and NBER; Jonathan Zinman: 
jzinman@dartmouth.edu, Dartmouth College, IPA, J-PAL, and NBER. We thank Yapi Kredi staff for 
their cooperation; Michael Grubb, Ben Keys, David Laibson, Eva Nagypal, Josh Schwartzstein, 
Andrei Shleifer, and audiences at Boston College, Harvard/MIT, Kellogg (Finance), LSE, UCL, 
University of Maryland, University of Virginia, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the CFPB 
Research Conference, and the NBER Law & Economics group for comments; and Benni Savonitto, 
Glynis Startz, and Zachary Groff for research management and analysis support. Authors did not have 
direct conflicts of interest but are associated with other entities concerned with overdraft fees. 
Disclosure information is available online. 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
2 
 
Businesses with such revenue models typically focus their marketing and competitive 
strategy on the base good, even though add-ons/overages can be critical revenue sources. 
Retail banking provides a striking example: banks often market checking accounts as 
free, even though many consumers end up paying high fees for overdraft credit.
1
 Government 
audits find that banks rarely market overdraft services at the customer acquisition stage and 
even actively discourage employees from providing information on overdraft terms (General 
Accounting Office (2008), Competition and Markets Authority (2014), Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau v. TCF National Bank (2017)). After acquiring customers, banks in some 
markets including Turkey, the site of our experiment, blur the line between positive and 
negative balances by highlighting for customers an available-to-withdraw figure that adds the 
available overdraft credit line amount to the checking account balance, while making 
information on disaggregated balances and finance charges more difficult to find. Turkish 
banks during our study period basically drew attention to overdrafts only when promoting the 
feature to existing customers. Yet even those promotions did not explicitly mention the price 
of overdraft credit. 
Why would a bank hide information on overdraft costs? After all, a classically rational 
consumer would simply infer that shrouded prices are high prices. But recent behavioral 
theories show that shrouded and high prices can persist if consumers tend to underestimate 
their add-on costs and firms cannot profit from de-biasing consumers with more transparent 
                                                          
1
 An overdraft occurs if the checking account holder initiates a transaction that makes her balance 
negative or more negative. 
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pricing or information about competitors’ high add-on prices (Gabaix and Laibson (2006), 
Grubb (2015), Heidhues, Köszegi, and Murooka (2017)).
2
  
Bank regulators respond to such practices in various ways. For example in the U.S. 
regulators require upfront consumer opt-in for debit card and ATM overdrafts, in both the 
U.S. and U.K. regulators caution banks against relying too heavily on overdraft, and in 
Turkey regulators cap overdraft prices. 
Empirical evidence, however, is lacking on key questions raised by theory and policy. Do 
consumers actually underestimate costs of add-ons such as overdrafts? Do firms actually have 
incentives to shroud add-on prices instead of competing to de-bias consumers? How do 
consumers allocate attention to add-ons? and how quickly does consumer learning about add-
ons break a shrouded equilibrium? In short, empirical evidence on what drives overdraft 
pricing, advertising, and usage is limited and largely descriptive. 
These questions are central to overdraft markets. Beginning in the 1990s, overdraft 
revenue replaced monthly subscription fees as banks’ major source of explicit income from 
checking accounts, shifting the pricing equilibrium for retail banking in much of the world  to 
―free if nonnegative balance, very expensive if in overdraft.‖ In the U.S., banks collect more 
than $10 billion in overdraft revenue annually. In the UK, banks derive almost as much 
income from overdrafts as from re-investing checking account deposits (Competition and 
Markets Authority 2014). In Turkey, the site of our experiment, the announcement of a price 
                                                          
2
 For related evidence on consumer perceptions of overdraft costs, see Armstrong and Vickers (2012) 
and Stango and Zinman (2014). For related models of limited and reactive consumer attention, see, 
for example, Gabaix (2014) and Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2015). 
 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
4 
 
ceiling on overdrafts was immediately followed by a 1.4% reduction in bank share prices, 
with a 2.1% drop for the most overdraft-reliant bank (Toksabay (2013)). 
We worked with Yapi Kredi (YK), one of the largest banks in Turkey, to design a 
randomized direct marketing experiment that distinguishes between classical and behavioral 
models of add-on pricing and advertising. YK sought to learn more about its optimal strategy 
for pricing and advertising its overdraft product. The last was particularly interested in 
understanding whether its past promotional pricing and advertising content tactics were 
effective in increasing demand, and if not why not. YK’s interest rate (60% APR) and 
product design was in line with standard practices and regulations. As is common in overdraft 
markets, the product was priced expensively relative to seemingly close substitutes (like 
credit cards), and disproportionally to credit risk (as recently found by Turkish authorities).  
YK sought to target marginal overdrafters among its existing client base, and hence the 
experiment varied the promotions that YK sent via SMS from September to December 2012 
to 108,000 existing checking account clients who had not overdrafted during the previous few 
months. These clients are likely representative of a substantial population of marginal 
overdrafters in Turkey, and they share key characteristics with ―banked‖ populations in both 
more- and less-developed countries.  
The experimental design produces random variation, both across clients and over time, in 
overdraft prices and in messaging content, frequency, and duration (see Figure 1). Our tests 
rely on overdraft-usage comparisons across groups receiving different promotions, since 
Turkish banks frequently use SMS-based promotions (a pure control group would be off-
equilibrium). The key comparison is between overdraft-promoting messages that mention 
price and those that do not.  
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[FIGURE 1. Experimental design] 
 
Our key hypothesis is that drawing attention to overdraft costs reduces demand for 
overdrafts. This would hold if consumers tend to underestimate overdraft costs and have 
limited/reactive attention, in which case mentioning price could jog memory that overdrafts 
are costly, motivate individuals to learn the correct and higher price, and/or increase attention 
to avoiding overdrafts. In contrast, mentioning price will not reduce overdraft demand if 
consumers are classically rational and hence correctly perceive overdraft costs on average. 
Our test of this hypothesis is one-sided in the sense that in our experiment YKmentions 
price only while also cutting it: the overdraft pricing arms of our experiment all offer 50% 
discounts on overdrafts. This stacks the deck against finding a negative effect of mentioning 
overdraft price, since even a behavioral consumer who is susceptible to shrouding 
presumably prefers lower prices. Yet we still find that mentioning overdraft price lowers 
overdraft demand. For example, the likelihood of overdrafting during the experiment is 1.2 
percentage points lower (se=0.4 percentage points) for those receiving the discount offer 
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relative to those receiving a message that mentions overdraft without also mentioning its 
price, on a baseline likelihood of 31%. 
Another behavioral hypothesis is that bundling the overdraft discount with a discount on 
debit card or automated bill-payment usage further depresses demand. The idea is that 
mentioning overdrafts together with transactions that could trigger overdrafts could be a 
particularly powerful reminder to avoid such transactions, akin to the attention-by-association 
findings in Stango and Zinman (2014).
3
 Again, both classical and mechanical forces work 
against finding support for this hypothesis; in the absence of behavioral factors, the bundled 
discounts should generate weakly more outflows from the checking account, producing 
weakly more variance in the checking account balance and hence weakly more overdrafts. 
Nevertheless, we continue to find support for the behavioral hypothesis. Offering the 
overdraft discount alone reduces overdraft likelihood by only 0.7 percentage points (se=0.5) 
relative to messages that mention overdraft without also mentioning price, while the bundled 
reductions are 1.4 percentage points for automated bill payment (se=0.5) and 1.7 percentage 
points for debit card (se=0.5).  
Importantly, discounts on the bundled products themselves do not backfire in the same 
way that overdraft discounts do: offering a discount for debit card usage or automated bill-
payment authorization weakly increases demand for those services. These results further 
highlight the distinction between advertising shrouded attributes (overdraft) versus 
unshrouded attributes (debit or autopay).  
                                                          
3
 Stango and Zinman (2014) find that drawing consumer attention to spending control, monitoring 
account balances, or other bank fees leads to overdraft reductions. 
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As noted above, our experimental design also includes an overdraft availability promotion 
that does not mention price. We can identify its effects on demand by comparing it to 
messages that do not mention overdraft at all (they promote debit or automated bill-payment 
transactions alone). We find that the overdraft availability message increases overdraft 
likelihood, by about 0.9 percentage points (se=0.4). We do not find heterogeneous effects 
based on prior overdraft experience (although the confidence intervals do not rule out 
meaningful differences), suggesting that overdraft availability is not salient/top-of-mind even 
if the consumer is already informed about availability in some classical sense. This finding 
suggests that, after acquiring a customer, firms can promote non price aspects of add-ons 
without drawing attention to costs. 
Together, our results are consistent with models of shrouded equilibrium and 
limited/reactive consumer attention. In particular, they support (1) the key modeling 
assumption that consumers tend to underestimate add-on costs (if consumers’ estimates were 
unbiased then offering a discount would weakly increase demand), (2) the key assumption 
that firms lack incentives to unshroud prices, (3) a key prediction of reactive attention models 
that consumers respond differently when advertising highlights different add-on attributes 
(price or availability). Shifts from shrouded to unshrouded equilibria may therefore be costly 
to generate and sustain. In section V we discusses alternative, more classical interpretations, 
and why they do not provide as complete an explanation of our setting and results.  
Our paper informs several other literatures on limited attention, salience, and advertising. 
First, our results provide insights into what comes to mind and what does not (Bordalo, 
Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013), Eliaz and Spiegler (2011), Gabaix (2014), Hanna, 
Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (2014), Karlan et al. (2016)). Second, our resultsshow that 
price promotions have attention effects that can backfire from the promoter’s perspective, 
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thereby adding evidence to literatures on the psychology of incentives (Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000), Kamenica (2012)) and price changes (Hastings and Shapiro (2013)) that 
have not yet focused much on shrouded prices. Our results are consistent with findings from 
other domains suggesting that consumers respond differently to base prices and add-on prices 
(Anagol and Kim (2012), Brown, Hossain, and Morgan (2010), Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 
(2009)).
4
 
Relatedly, our findings contrast with those in Ferman (2016) and Elizondo and Seira 
(2017), who find little impact of messaging in Brasil and Mexico, respectively that makes the 
base price of high-interest credit cards more prominent. Our results are broadly consistent 
with prior workthat shows advertising content can have important and surprising effects on 
decisions about expensive debt (Bertrand et al. (2010)), and that messaging from banks can 
change the behavior of existing customers (Cadena and Schoar (2011), Karlan, Morten, and 
Zinman (2015), Kast, Meier, and Pomeranz (2016)). Our results on the long-run effects of 
short-run messaging complement the literature on the dynamics of learning and/or attention 
regarding add-on charges (Agarwal et al. (2013), Ater and Landsman (2013), Haselhuhn et al. 
(2012), Stango and Zinman (2014)), may help explain why advertising is so prevalent 
(treatment effects dissipate quickly and hence repeated exposure matters), and suggest that 
                                                          
4
 We do not actually observe price sensitivity to the base price in our setting. But given our result that 
cutting overdraft prices depresses overdraft demand, we can infer differential sensitivity to base and 
add-on prices simply by assuming that cutting the base price would not decrease demand for checking 
accounts. 
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short-run behavior changes do not necessarily induce learning or greater sophistication about 
attention (Schwartzstein (2014), Manoli and Turner (2015)).
5
  
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section I describes the overdraft market in 
our study site, Section II explains our experimental design and describes our sample. We 
present our empirical results in Section III, and provide a detailed discussion in Section IV. 
Finally, Section V concludes. The appendix provides figures and tables with additional 
results. 
I. Setting: The Overdraft Market in Turkey 
 We discuss the economic importance of overdrafts in the introduction. Here we 
describe our partner bank, YK, and the Turkish overdraft market. Our setting has many 
similarities to overdraft markets in other countries like the U.S. and UK, with a key 
                                                          
5
 Stango and Zinman, (SZ, 2014) is probably the most closely related empirical paper to ours. SZ use 
quasi-experimental variation in survey content in a market research panel in the U.S. to identify 
effects and dynamics of attention to overdraft fees. Similar to here, SZ find that an attention shock 
mentioning overdraft costs reduces overdraft usage, and that repeated attention shocks cumulate to 
some extent, although they depreciate more quickly in our setting. Aside from the obvious differences 
between the two study designs— market research surveys versus bank advertising as attention shocks, 
quasi-random versus random variation, U.S. versus Turkey—there are at least two other key 
differences. First, we have randomly assigned price variation. Second, our treatments include some 
messages that mention the overdraft service but not its cost. These differences lead to the surprising 
new inferences that bringing overdrafts to mind increases demand, but bringing the price of overdrafts 
to mind, even if accompanied by a discount, lowers demand. See also Liu, Montgomery, Srinivasan 
(2014) and Hunt, Kelly, Garavito (2015). 
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difference being substantially lower prices in Turkey (60% APR versus $25 to $40 per-
transaction fees for very small and short-term loans).
6
 
A. Retail and Mobile Banking in Turkey  
Turkey’s retail/consumer banking industry is concentrated. Only about 30 banks are 
licensed to take deposits, and the five largest banks have greater than 50% market share. YK 
is in the top five based on both total assets and number of branches, and is publicly traded. In 
recent years the Turkish market has become known for innovation in retail banking, with one 
bank rolling out the largest biometric ATM network in the region, and another bank 
becoming the first in the world to make money transfers possible on Facebook. Turkey has 
the highest rate of mobile banking in Europe among internet users, at around 50%, according 
to a 2013 ING survey, and 91% of Turkish adults have a cell phone, for one of the highest 
penetration rates in the world. 
B. Overdraft Practices 
The focus of our experiment is a checking account overdraft product, which YK 
brands the ―Flexible Account,‖ with features that were standard in Turkey (and throughout 
the world) during our study period. The product is an unsecured line of credit that allows 
                                                          
6
 For details on overdraft markets in the U.S. and Europe, see, for example, Stango and Zinman (2014) 
and various government reports (Bakker et al. (2014), Competition and Markets Authority (2014), 
Financial Conduct Authority (2014), General Accounting Office (2008)). For policy developments in 
the U.S. and EU, see, for example, FDIC Supervisory Guidance warning banks about the risks of 
―excessive use‖ of overdrafts by customers and ―maximizing fees‖ by banks, Dougherty (2014), and 
the European Parliament’s Directive on Payment Accounts (issued April 2014). 
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qualifying customers to overdraw their account (i.e., to hold a negative balance) at a cost of 
60% APR on outstanding credit (about 50% after adjusting for inflation). Credit card APRs 
tend to be substantially lower. The bank approves about 55% of checking account customers 
for the overdraft feature, with credit limits that vary based on underwriting but that are 
typically lower than other unsecured credit products. Although individuals can apply for the 
overdraft feature, which typically (and in our study) the bank automatically chooses 
individuals to be given the feature, which thus requires individuals opt-out if they do not want 
it rather than opt-in if they do. Customers then use the line, automatically, any time their 
checking account falls (further) below zero. Negative balances begin accruing interest 
immediately. By law, any inflow to the checking account is automatically allocated first 
toward paying off overdraft credit. If inflows are not sufficient to clear the balance by the end 
of the statement date (four weeks), the bank sends the customer a notice and gives them about 
two weeks to pay at least the accrued interest. If the customer fails to make the required 
payment after 60 days, the bank freezes the overdraft line. 
Overdrafts have attracted regulatory scrutiny because they—and their prices—are 
rarely featured at the customer acquisition stage, and often are not fully disclosed even post-
acquisition. Pre-acquisition, we are not aware of any mass marketing campaigns promoting 
overdraft usage during our sample period in Turkey. Regulators have found that when banks 
did communicate with (prospective) consumers, they often failed to provide mandated 
disclosures or did so only perfunctorily.  
  Communications with existing customers also indicate a (partially) shrouded 
equilibrium during our sample period. Customers lacked easy access to information on their 
own overdraft usage and charges. Banks did not routinely issue monthly statements, due to 
the unreliable postal system, and electronic notifications of overdraft usage did not mention 
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the interest rate. Electronic banking was and is the dominant channel for customers getting 
information on their accounts, and online information on overdraft usage was folded into the 
customer’s main transaction record rather than disaggregated. The transaction record would 
specify the amount charged in overdraft interest, but not the interest rate. Landing pages—the 
first screen the customer sees after logging in online or at an ATM- would obscure whether 
overdraft was being used by highlighting the customer’s balance based on ―available-to-
withdraw‖ (including credit line) instead of just the checking account balance. A customer 
seeking interest rate information would need to either navigate through several different 
screens or contact a customer service representative. Banks promoted overdraft usage to 
existing customers in direct messaging campaigns, but those campaigns did not mention the 
level of the interest rate even when offering discounts on that rate; for example, an ad would 
say ―half off your interest charges‖ instead of ―half off your 60% interest rate.‖ 
C. Overdraft Users and Usage in Turkey 
Who overdrafts? In Turkey there are not much data on the characteristics of 
overdrafters (e.g., our data lack information on education or income), but there are some 
clues. Over half of Turkey’s population is unbanked, according to a 2012 World Bank report. 
Moreover, many checking account holders are not approved for overdraft lines of credit due 
to credit risk that banks cannot price. These facts together suggest that overdrafters come 
from the upper half of the income distribution in Turkey, although not from the uppermost 
percentiles, who presumably have wealth and access to cheaper credit that would tend to 
render overdrafting unlikely and/or relatively unattractive. 
Our customer sample overdrafts frequently in the ten months after our experiment 
started, despite having been selected for the experiment based on infrequent overdraft activity 
prior to the experiment (Section III. B; Table I). In any given month 15% to 24% of our 
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sample overdrafts and 45.8% of our sample overdrafts at least once between September 1, 
2012 to June 30, 2013, paying a mean finance charge of 30.82 TL (1 TL = $0.56 USD during 
our sample period) over the ten months, (the 95
th
 percentile is 228.08 TL).  
The sharp increase in overdrafting from baseline to (post-) experiment is probably not 
due to mean reversion, as overdrafting tends to be strongly serially correlated month-to-
month. Rather, discussions with YK and its regulators point to a market-wide increase that 
flowed from easy monetary policy to widespread promotions by consumer lenders around the 
end of Ramadan to overdrafts spurred by subsequent difficulties marginal borrowers had in 
managing their increased debt service. In any case, the sharp increase in overdrafting is 
evident in both aggregate data and YK’s customer base. YK held back a no-message group of 
39,000 customers from our experiment, and Figures 2 panels A and B, show similar trends in 
overdraft usage for this group compared to our experimental group of 108,000 customers.
7
 
[FIGURE 2: Overdraft Usage over time (panel A and panel B)] 
                                                          
7
 YK applied somewhat different and not entirely reproducible filters in selecting the no-message 
comparison group, so we do not use this group as a pure control group for analysis purposes. Creating 
a pure, randomized control group was not a point of emphasis at the design and implementation stages 
of the experiment, since the equilibrium was one of extensive direct messaging and hence the 
mapping of message versus no-message comparisons to theory is less clear than comparisons across 
different promotions. 
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Figure 2. Overdraft Usage over time. This figure plots average overdraft amounts used over time 
(panel A) and overdraft usage rates over time (panel B). ―Overdraft Usage‖ is indicated by any 
overdraft balance in a given month. The ―Treatment‖ group comprises the 108,000 accounts included 
in our experiment; The ―Comparison‖ group was selected by YK and not included in our experiment. 
The experimental period covers August 30, 2012 through December 31, 2012. Dips just prior to the 
experimental period are due to the sample selection criterion of ―no overdraft use in May, June, and 
July 2012.‖ 
D. Policy Postscript 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
15 
 
As noted above, overdraft practices have been attracting legal scrutiny around the 
globe. In July 2013, seven months after our experiment ended, the Turkish Competition 
Authority found that banks were benefiting from substantial markups over risk-based prices 
and fined 12 banks for price-fixing on loans, including overdrafts. On May 27, 2013, the 
Turkish Central Bank imposed a binding price ceiling on overdraft APR. Turkish regulators 
have also focused on marketing and communications since our experiment ended, pressuring 
and working with banks to make overdraft usage, pricing, and costs more transparent. 
E. Ethics of Experimenting with High-Cost Credit 
In seminars we are frequently asked whether researchers should partner with a lender that 
is seeking to sell more high-interest rate loans. We think yes, in this circumstance as in many 
related experiments on microcredit where take-up is an outcome of interest, for four main 
reasons. First, an ethical concern here presumes that high-cost consumer credit harms 
consumers. But extensive research on this question suggests that a different assumption is 
warranted- (weakly) beneficial impacts for consumers (Karlan and Zinman (2010), Zinman 
(2014), Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015)). Second, YK’s advertising was truthful and its 
terms were competitive. Thus, combining the first and second points, the experiment was not 
trying to convince consumers to accept a bad deal either in absolute terms or compared to 
market alternatives. Third, YK was going to promote overdraft usage among its existing 
customers with or without the participation of the research team and we helped convince 
bank management to feature prices despite its skepticism about the effectiveness of past 
overdraft price promotions. Fourth, YK and the research team contracted ex-ante that the 
academic co-authors would have unrestricted intellectual freedom to report the results and 
disseminate them publicly to benefit regulators and further scientific knowledge. 
II. Experimental Design, Sample, and Data 
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A. Experimental Design and Implementation 
Figure 1 summarizes the experimental design and details the script of each message 
variant. The field experiment randomly assigns message content, frequency, and duration, as 
well as promotional offers on overdraft, debit card, and automated bill payment, to a sample 
of 108,000 checking account holders. YK did not send this sample any other promotional 
communications during this campaign. The only other communications YK sent to this 
sample were monthly account statements. YK sent the messages by SMS, which is the most 
common way banks communicate with their clients in Turkey.  
YK began the experiment by sending half of the sample an ―Overdraft Availability‖ 
message on August 30, 2012 that mentions the overdraft service and credit line but nothing 
about its cost.
8
 This first randomization is not crucial for testing our main hypotheses; it 
served primarily as a pilot for the subsequent randomizations and a test for a heterogeneous 
treatment effect suggested by some of the motivating theoretical models (Section IV). 
YK continued the experiment on September 15, 2012 with a second, independent 
randomization, sending each person in the sample one of six randomly assigned promotions. 
Half of the sample received one of the three ―Overdraft Interest Discount‖ messages detailed 
in Figure 1, with one-third of this group (or of this half) getting only an overdraft discount, 
one-third getting an overdraft discount plus an automated bill payment discount, and one-
                                                          
8
 ―We remind you that, for your immediate cash needs, you have a Flexible Account at Yapi Kredi 
with [custom fill]TL limit. Have a nice day.‖ One might think of this message as a ―reminder‖ 
because the bank’s policy and Turkish law require upfront disclosure of the overdraft features and 
pricing. However, given that the service is offered on an opt-out basis, and that our motivating 
questions concern shrouding prices, we allow for the possibility that this message provides new 
information rather than being a simple reminder. We explore this possibility in Section IV. 
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third getting an overdraft discount plus a debit card discount. The other half of the sample did 
not get an overdraft interest discount, with one-third of this half getting the automated bill 
payment discount only, one-third getting the debit card discount only, and one-third getting 
only the overdraft availability reminder message described above.  
An independent frequency randomization determined whether YK re-sent the 
September 15 message frequently (every 10 days), less frequently (every 20 days), or not 
again during the campaign period. A campaign duration randomization then determined 
whether the price promotion(s) or overdraft availability reminder, and any repeated 
messaging subsequent to September 15, lasted until November 15 or December 15. 
Note that YK sent at least one message to everyone in our sample during the 
experiment. YK preferred this design feature because, like other banks, it often sends 
promotional and reminder messages to its customers and thought it would be 
counterproductive to scale back directed advertising to zero. The research team also preferred 
this design— placebo communications with respect to overdraft, rather than pure control—
because any contact from YK could trigger the customer’s attention and affect her usage of 
YK products.
9
 
B. Baseline Data on Sample Characteristics, and Balance Checks 
YK sought to promote overdraft usage among existing clients who it deemed most 
likely to be close to the margin of overdrafting. To this end it selected customers for the 
experiment based on the following criteria: owned a YK checking account for at least a year, 
                                                          
9
 A closely related way of framing our interest in placebo communications is that frequent direct-
messaging is the equilibrium, but we thought that the experiment would link more tightly to theory if 
the only deviations from equilibrium were around (partial) unshrouding. 
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were in good standing in the account, and had a debit card linked to it; had an active cell 
phone; maintained an average total deposit account balance<5,000TL over the three months 
prior to the start of the experiment (May toJuly 2012); did not have more than three 
automated bill payments set up; and already had the overdraft service in place but had not 
used it during the prior three months. Many of these customers did have some experience 
with the product before the three-month period prior to the experiment. Our pre-treatment 
data go back as far as September 2011, and from September 2011 to April 2012 18.4% of our 
sample overdrafted at least once, with an average daily overdraft balance of 4.42TL (SD 23, 
Max 940) among these accountholders.  
Table I summarizes the baseline data available to us (Column (1)) and checks balance 
across treatment assignments (Columns (2) to (10)). In terms of demographics, we have 
information only on gender (29% female), city of residence (28% Istanbul, 23% outside the 
four largest cities), and marital status (57% married). This information is collected by the 
bank at the account-opening stage and can be updated later by the client. Besides pre-
treatment data on overdraft usage (described above and in Table I), we also have data on the 
other behaviors targeted by the experiment: debit card usage and automatic debits for bill 
payments. We stratified on each of these baseline variables. The last column confirms that 
none of them is correlated with treatment assignment by regressing each row variable on the 
treatment assignments indicated Columns (2) to (10).  
C. Follow-Up Data 
YK provided us with data on overdraft usage, debit card usage, automated bill 
payment authorizations, and deposit account balances, at the account-month level, from 
September 1, 2012 through the end of June 2013 (although we do not use the June 2013 data 
due to the binding price cap imposed at the end of May 2013). In addition to the monthly 
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data, YK provided us with daily data on overdraft usage for the experimental period, 
September 15 toDecember 15, 2012. We use these data to construct outcome variables for 
estimating the short-run and longer-run treatment effects detailed below. 
D. Hypotheses and Tests  
Our main hypothesis is that drawing attention to the cost of overdrafting will depress 
demand for it. The motivation for this hypothesis comes from two key features of behavioral 
models of costly add-ons like overdrafts. First, consumers tend to underestimate, and have 
limited/reactive attention to, add-on costs.
10
 Mentioning price could thus jog memory that 
overdrafts are costly, motivate individuals to learn the correct and higher price, and/or 
increase attention to avoiding overdrafts. Any of these channels could lead the consumer to 
revise her cost estimate upward and reduce her overdraft usage. In contrast, drawing attention 
to overdraft cost will not reduce demand if consumers are classically rational and hence 
correctly perceive overdraft costs on average. Second, and closely related to the demand 
                                                          
10
 Consumers can underestimate the price conditional on overdrafting (perhaps because they anchor 
on substantially lower prices for other bank services or sources of short-term credit), and/or 
underestimate the likelihood of overdrafting (perhaps they perceive it to be zero because they assume 
the bank will not let them overdraft, or perhaps they are overconfident about avoiding overdrafts). 
Grubb (2015) assumes that consumers perceive the price accurately but underestimate the likelihood 
of overdrafting, because they underestimate their cost of attention to balances. See also Grubb (2009). 
In terms of the other models most closely related to our setup, Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Heidhues, 
Köszegi, and Murooka (2017), and Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2015) assume that some 
consumers underestimate a reduced-form add-on cost that, in our setting, is the product of the price of 
overdrafting and the expected number of overdrafts (or, on the extensive margin, the product of the 
price of overdrafting and the likelihood of overdrafting). 
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response in the first feature, unshrouding costs (e.g., by drawing consumer attention to them) 
may be unprofitable for the add-on supplier. 
We test this hypothesis by comparing overdraft usage during the experimental period 
between customers sent an Overdraft Interest Discount message and customers sent an 
Overdraft Availability message. Both types of message promote overdraft usage, but only the 
Discount message says anything about the price. As noted in the introduction, this test 
actually stacks the deck toward rejecting our main hypothesis because the Discount message 
does not simply draw attention to overdraft costs, but also cuts the price in half.
11
 As such, 
accepting the hypothesis that the Overdraft Interest Discount message reduces demand—
despite offering a much lower price- would be an especially strong indication that add-on 
price advertising unshrouds add-on costs for consumers, leading consumers to sharply revise 
their cost perceptions upward depressing demand for the add-on, and proving unprofitable for 
the supplier. 
A second behavioral hypothesis is that bundling the overdraft discount with a discount 
on debit card or automated bill-payment usage will depress demand further. The idea is that 
mentioning overdrafts together with transactions that can trigger overdrafts could be a 
particularly powerful reminder to avoid overdrafts, akin to the findings in Stango and Zinman 
(2014) that drawing consumer attention to spending control mechanisms to monitor account 
balances, or other bank fees leads to overdraft reductions. Again, both classical and 
mechanical forces work against finding support for the behavioral hypothesis: in the absence 
of inattention the bundled discounts should generate weakly more outflows from the checking 
                                                          
11
 It would have been theoretically and statistically desirable to have experimental arms that simply 
mentioned the price of overdrafting without cutting it, and/or that mentioned the regular price (60% 
APR) while cutting it, but YK deemed such messaging too far off-equilibrium to be viable. 
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account, producing weakly more variance in the checking account balance and hence weakly 
more overdrafts. 
We test this bundling hypothesis by comparing overdraft usage, during the 
experimental period between customers sent an Overdraft Interest Discount only message and 
customers sent an Overdraft Interest Discount message that also includes a discount for 
automated bill payment or debit card use.
12
  
Third, we hypothesize that promoting overdraft availability, without mentioning price, 
will change demand. Classically rational consumers will have accurate perceptions of 
overdraft availability, at least on average, and should not respond. In contrast, behavioral 
mechanisms could generate either a negative response if advertising availability brings 
overdraft costs to mind, or a positive response. A positive response could arise if the 
overdraft service generally, and not just its cost, is not at top of mind for consumers. If 
consumers have reactive attention, then drawing attention to a positive feature of the 
service—its availability when one is short on cash—can increase demand for it. Another 
potential mechanism is that the message operates on consumers who thought that 
overdrafting was impossible and thus perceive zero likelihood and an infinite price of 
overdrafting. In this case the availability message could increase demand if it reduces the 
perceived price by more than it increases the perceived likelihood. We note that this 
mechanism would still be consistent with consumers underestimating overdraft costs at 
baseline, since impossibility implies zero expected cost.  
                                                          
12
 This is a conservative test of the hypothesized behavioral mechanism: the bundled messages are 
longer, and if longer messages tax limited attention, we would expect them to push treatment effects 
on overdrafting toward zero instead of further depressing demand. Ignoring a message makes it akin 
to getting no message at all. 
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We test whether and how promoting overdraft availability affects demand by 
comparing overdraft usage among customers sent the Overdraft Availability message to 
customers sent messages that promote only debit card or automated bill-payment usage and 
do not mention overdraft at all. 
Our final hypothesis focuses on understanding the dynamics of attention and overdraft 
behavior. The dynamics shed light on whether consumer learning and/or persistent attention 
to add-on costs break a shrouded equilibrium. For example, in Heidhues, Köszegi, and 
Murooka (2017) the profitability of high add-on prices is ―limited by consumers’ ex-post 
demand response to add-on prices‖ (p. 341), raising the possibility that, at the customer level, 
the firm wants to shroud at the customer acquisition stage but then unshroud while cutting the 
price of the add-on. In contrast, consumer forgetting and/or reactive attention to add-on costs 
increases the cost of de-biasing consumers, flattens or even reverses standard demand 
responses, and can make a shrouded equilibrium more durable. 
To test the dynamics, we examine data from the post-campaign period (January to 
May 2013). Treatment effects will persist if consumer learning or attention with respect to 
add-ons is durable. Treatment effects will not persist if consumers quickly forget about add-
ons or only attend to them when induced to do so by external stimuli like advertising. 
III. Specifications and Results 
We estimate OLS regressions at the level of YK’s randomizations—the checking account, 
indexed by i— and a timeframe that corresponds to either during- or post-experimental 
advertising (indexed by t): 
Yit =  Tiβ+ Xiα+eit 
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where Y is some measure of a behavior targeted by the marketing campaign (overdraft usage, 
debit card usage, or an automatic debit for bill payment) In Tables II and III we measure 
outcomes over a time period designed to capture immediate/short-run treatment effects: t 
covers September 15 to December 31, since the bank sent everyone at least one promotional 
message starting September 15 and sent the last promotional messages on December 15. 
Table IV measures outcomes over the post-experiment period, January 2013 to May 2013.  
T is a vector of treatment assignments (see Figure 1), with β the vector of estimated 
coefficients on those treatment variables and X is a vector of the stratification variables used 
to block the randomization (see Table I). 
Our main tables define the treatment vector to test our main hypothesis with the 
simplest possible presentation. In particular, we make use of additive specifications that 
enable us to keep the omitted treatment category consistent across columns within each table, 
and to facilitate inference about comparisons of theoretical interest: overdraft promotions that 
mention price versus those that do not (rows (4) to (7) in Tables II and IV), and price 
promotions on other banking services that are bundled with overdraft discounts versus those 
that are not (rows (2) and (4) in Table III). The Appendix presents a more comprehensive set 
of results. 
A. Main Effects of Overdraft Promotions on Overdrafting, During Experiment 
Table II presents the estimated effects of the different overdraft promotions on three 
measures of overdraft usage during the experimental period (September 15 to December 31, 
2012).  
Rows (1) and (3) estimate effects of the Overdraft Availability message, which does 
not mention costs or offer a discount. This message increases demand for overdraft relative 
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to not getting a message on August 30
th
 (rows (1) and (2)), and relative to messages that do 
not mention overdraft (row (3)).
13
 The magnitudes are on the order of 1 percentage point in 
1/0 usage, 0.1 days with an overdraft balance, and 1TL in average overdraft balance. These 
results support the hypothesis that promoting overdrafts without reference to cost increases 
demand, the most straightforward interpretation of which is that consumers have limited and 
reactive attention to all aspects of the overdraft service, not just to its cost.  
Row (4) presents estimates of the effect of getting an overdraft interest promotion 
relative to getting the Overdraft Availability message, which does not mention price. Reading 
across columns one can see that this effect is negative—offering a lower price leads to lower 
demand— with estimates for two of the three demand measures having p-value < 0.01. The 
extensive margin decreases by 1.2 percentage points (se=0.4), and days with a balance falls 
by 0.16 (se=0.05), for declines of 4% and 6% relative to the sample means. These results 
support the hypothesis that drawing attention to overdraft costs reduced demand (even while 
offering a 50% discount!), with the key implications being that consumers tend to 
underestimate overdraft costs and banks lack incentives to unshroud or compete on overdraft 
prices because doing so backfires.
14
  
                                                          
13
 One might wonder whether the ―Have a nice day‖ portion of the availability message might be 
driving the effects rather than a reminder about availability per se, but if this were the case one might 
expect to see customers responding to the bank’s friendliness by using other banking services more. 
We do not find any such evidence (see appendix Table A II, row (3)). 
14
 In Appendix Table AI we confirm that lower demand likely maps into lower profitability for the 
bank, as we do not find any evidence that account balances increase to offset lost overdraft revenue 
with increased implicit interest. Stango and Zinman (2014) also infer that consumers do not engineer 
overdraft reductions with balance infusion.  
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Rows (5), (6), and (7) decompose the overdraft interest discount effects into the 
overdraft discount only (row (5)), and the overdraft discount bundled with discounts for auto-
pay (row (6)) or debit card use (row (7)). These results suggest that the overdraft discount by 
itself does not depress demand to a statistically significant degree (although each of the point 
estimates is negative); rather, it is the bundled discounts that drive the backfiring effect (see 
also Table III, columns (3) to (5), rows (2) and (4), which compare bundled discounts to the 
overdraft discount only). These results support the hypothesis that bundling overdraft 
discounts with other discounts is particularly demand-depressing. As discussed above, our 
favored interpretation is that attention to overdraft costs is reactive and associative; we 
consider alternative interpretations in Section V.
15
  
The treatment effects in Table II are likely economically as well as statistically 
significant, for several reasons. First, they suggest that drawing attention to overdraft costs 
induces upward-sloping demand, which is rarely seen and hence qualitatively important. 
Second, the messaging here does not mention the level of costs; instead, YK offers to give 
back ―half of the interest charges.‖  A pure de-biasing strategy would likely mention the price 
or cost level, along the lines of: ―Beware of overdrafts at 60% APR!‖ Messaging that 
highlighted the 60% APR might depress demand even more, suggesting that we identify a 
lower bound on the effects of unshrouding overdraft costs. Third, messaging costs are low, 
and hence bank strategy is sensitive to small changes in demand. Fourth, our estimates 
identify the effects of sending messages rather than of consumers attending to them. Some 
                                                          
15
 Another possible mechanism is directly testable: in Appendix Table AI, Panel B, we do not find any 
evidence that the automated bill-payment and debit card promotions lead to higher account balances, 
casting doubt on the possibility that these promotions motivate individuals to maintain larger bank 
account balances and thereby produce less overdrafting. 
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recipients may have ignored the messages. This implies that our estimates represent lower 
bounds for the effects on consumers who actually paid attention to the messages.  
B. Do All Promotional Discounts Backfire? No. 
In table III we check whether other promotional discounts backfire as well by 
estimating treatment effects of the debit card and automated bill-payment discount offers on 
their targeted behaviors during the experiment. The key results here are presented in columns 
(1) and (2). In particular, row (1)-column (1) shows that offering the debit discount alone 
weakly increase debit card usage by 0.5 percentage points (se=0.4), and row (3)-column (2) 
estimates that the auto-pay discount alone increases auto-pay signup by 0.4 percentage points 
(se=0.1). These effects are each scaled relative to the Overdraft Interest Discount Only 
message (notice that the omitted category here is different here than in Table II, since here we 
are primarily interested in whether the other discounts affect demand for their services).
16
 
Row (2)-column (1) and row (4)-column (2) test whether bundling a discount with the 
Overdraft Interest Discount message performs differently, with respect to demand for debit 
cards and auto-pay, than offering a discount on debit or auto-pay alone. We do not find 
evidence of differential effects. 
In sum, we find no evidence that offering discounts on other bank services backfires 
with respect to demand for those services, and some evidence that they increase demand as 
intended. 
                                                          
16
 Alternative comparisons, not shown in the table, produce similar inferences. If, for example, we 
instead estimate effects relative to not getting a debit card discount, the Debit Card Discount Only 
coefficient for 1/0 debit card usage is 0.0067 (se=0.0039), and the Debit Card Discount + Overdraft 
Interest Discount coefficient is 0.0059 (se=0.0039). 
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C. Do Treatment Effects Persist? Post-Experiment Effects of Overdraft Messaging 
Table IV reestimates our main specifications from Table II over the post-promotional 
campaign period for the two overdraft usage measures for which we have data from January 
to May 2013. (Recall that the most-intensively treated accountholders in our experiment 
received their last message on December 15, 2012.) We find no statistically significant 
evidence that treatment effects persist over the five-month post-experiment period: the 
overdraft discount effect is no longer demand-depressing, and the overdraft availability effect 
is no longer demand-increasing. Figure 3, panels A and B, plot the two treatment effects and 
their confidence intervals month-by-month for our 1/0 measure of overdraft usage. As can be 
seen, both treatment effects trend toward zero over the post-campaign period and lose 
statistical significance about two months post-campaign (between February and March). 
 
[FIGURE 3: Effects of Overdraft Availability Message and Overdraft Interest Discount on 
Overdraft Usage Rate (Panel A and Panel B)] 
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Figure 3. Effects of Overdraft Availability Message and Overdraft Interest Discount on 
Overdraft Usage Rate. This figure plots month-by-month treatment effects and associated 
confidence bands covering the post-experiment period (January to May 2013). Coefficients are 
estimated using a monthly version of the specification in Table IV, Column (1).  
 
The results in table IV suggest that the overdrafting changes induced by bank 
promotions are not ―sticky‖: the changes do not persist long after the promotions stop. This 
could be related to the fact that consumers overdraft passively in the course of checking 
account usage (rather than explicitly drawing from a line of credit): overdrafts are plausibly 
low ―exposure‖ and hence relatively likely to be ignored or forgotten (Bordalo, Gennaioli, 
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and Shleifer (2015)). In any case, the lack of persistent effects suggests that consumer 
learning and/or attention concerning overdrafts depreciates quickly, and hence that 
advertising and de-biasing campaigns must persist to be effective. 
D. Heterogeneous Effects of Overdraft Messaging? 
Our motivating models predict that responses to add-on advertising will vary with 
how well-informed and/or attentive the consumer is. For example, a well-informed and 
attentive consumer should exhibit a standard demand response to the overdraft interest 
discount (increasing, not decreasing, demand) and should respond weakly if at all to the 
overdraft availability reminder.   
We construct two proxies for baseline exposure to the overdraft product and then test 
whether each proxy mediates our main treatment effects. The first proxy is recent overdraft 
use prior to the experiment. We find that 18% of our sample overdrafted at some point during 
September 2011 to August 2012. Table V interacts a prior use indicator with our main 
treatment variables and shows little evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects (p-values at 
the bottom of the table). The second proxy is generated by the August 30
th
 Overdraft 
Availability message that YK sent to half of the sample. This initial message may have 
provided some consumers with information and/or drawn their attention to the add-on. But in 
Appendix Table A III we show that while the point estimate for the interest discount is more 
negative for those who first received the August 30
th
 Overdraft Availability message, the 
difference is not statistically significant (p-values at bottom of the table). We caution, 
however, that the confidence intervals for the heterogeneity results include both null and 
economically important point estimates.  
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We also examine heterogeneity with respect to baseline checking account balances. 
The intuition is that those with higher account balances may be less responsive to the 
messages (both availability and discount), as the messages are less relevant for them. As 
reported in Table VI, we do not find any evidence of heterogeneity in this regard. This could 
reflect the fact that most accounts, even those with above-median balances at baseline, dip 
low enough that overdrafting is viable and relevant. (Unfortunately we lack baseline data on 
minimum balances). 
Another interesting margin of heterogeneity concerns the hypothesis that the most-
intense overdraft users should be better informed about overdraft costs and more attuned to 
overdraft availability, in which case both treatment effects should attenuate and even flip sign 
at high usage. We examine this hypothesis by estimating quantile treatment effects, and do 
see hints of the expected pattern (Appendix Figure A1). However, we caution that these 
quantile regressions provide only coarse tests of the relationship between overdraft intensity 
and demand responses —they are underpowered, and they identify the heterogeneity of 
interest only with the additional assumption that ordinal position in the overdraft distribution 
is unaffected by the messages. 
E. Other Treatment Variations: Messaging Frequency and Duration 
Appendix Table AIV examines our messaging frequency treatments. We find that 
more-frequent messaging amplifies the demand-depressing effect of the Overdraft Interest 
Discount message and the demand-increasing effect of the Overdraft Availability message. 
The odd columns in Appendix Table AIV estimate the effect of one-shot versus 
repeated messaging for the September 15
th
 message. In each treatment, the results are null for 
the one-shot and strong when the messages are repeated, that is, more negative for the 
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discount and more positive for availability. Thus, the results in Table II are driven by 
repeated messaging, not the one-shot message. Four of the six comparisons between the one-
shot and repeated messaging coefficients are statistically different from each other, and none 
of the six p-values is greater than 0.17. The even columns further separate repeated 
messaging into more- versus less-frequent (every 10 days versus every 20 days messaging), 
and although the point estimates on more-frequent messaging are larger in absolute value in 
five of the six comparisons, no difference is statistically significant. The key takeaways from 
Appendix Table AIV are that one message is not enough to generate an effect, and that repeat 
messaging influences demand, with diminishing marginal effects from messaging every 10 
versus 20 days.  
Appendix Table AV examines our other margin of messaging and promotional 
intensity, namely, the ―duration‖ or length of time, over which the bank continued to send 
messages and offer discounts. Recall that short-duration campaigns lasted until November 
15
th
, while long-duration campaigns continued until December 15
th
. We find little evidence 
that duration alone affects demand, either for the overdraft interest discount (row (5) versus 
row (6)), or for the overdraft availability message (row (2) versus row (3)), with the lone 
exception being the availability messaging effect on overdraft average balance (column (6)). 
Promotional intensity depends on duration and frequency, and the even numbered 
columns in Appendix Table AV shed light on these interactions for the overdraft discount 
(rows (7) to (10)) and the overdraft availability message (rows (2) to (4)). Comparing, for 
example, the most intense price promotion (row (7): long duration + messages after 
September 15) to the least intense promotion (row (10): short duration, no messages after 
September 15), we find lower demand for the most intense promotion in all three cases, with 
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p-values on the difference of 0.07, 0.08, and 0.002.
17
 We see a similar pattern of results for 
overdraft availability marketing, with the point estimate on the most intense promotion (row 
(2): long duration + messages after September 15) substantially larger than that on the least 
intense promotion (row (4): September 15 message and no subsequent ones), with p-values of 
0.07, 0.25, and 0.02.  
All told, we infer that more intense promotions amplify both the demand-increasing 
effect of the Overdraft Availability message and the demand-depressing effect of the 
Overdraft Interest Discount message. It could be the case that one message is sufficient to 
change behavior if noticed, but any one message is noticed with low probability. 
Alternatively, it could be the case that one message is sufficient to trigger awareness (of a 
shrouded attribute), but subsequent messages are required to trigger action. This also implies 
that demand responds more conventionally to less intense overdraft price promotion.  
IV. Discussion 
Taken together our results are consistent with models in which consumers have limited 
and reactive attention to add-ons like overdrafts, and suppliers respond by shrouding add-on 
costs. Specifically, it seems that overdraft costs and availability are not at the top of 
consumers’ mind, and even when brought closer to top of mind they do not stay there for 
long. As such, recent behavioral models of add-on pricing, marketing, and usage capture key 
aspects of reality, with consumers that tend to underestimate add-on costs and react strongly 
                                                          
17
 Note that the point estimates on one-shot messaging about the overdraft discount suggest weakly 
standard/downward-sloping price effects on demand (rows (1) and (5) in Appendix Table AIV, and 
rows (9) and (10) in Appendix Table AV). 
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but temporarily when their attention is drawn to add-on, and with firms that lack incentives to 
unshroud or compete on add-on costs. 
Classically rational models can explain at most a subset of our results. In principle, one 
could rationalize the finding that a large price discount decreases overdraft demand with a 
wealth effect that is big enough to counteract the standard price effect. In practice, such a 
wealth effect seems implausible. First, the wealth effect would likely operate among those 
who actually overdraft and have the most wealth to gain, yet we find effects on the extensive 
margin. Second, the demand reduction does not persist after the promotions stop, which 
implies that any wealth effect would have to be transient and begs the question of why, since 
the overdraft discount is conditional on usage and hence does not alleviate liquidity 
constraints. Third, a wealth effect should operate through non-overdraft discounts as well, yet 
we do not find any evidence that debit card or automated bill-payment discounts alone reduce 
overdrafting. Fourth, a wealth effect does not explain why overdraft availability messaging 
also affects demand.  
Another potential explanation for the overdraft price discount backfiring, particularly in 
light of Johnson, Meier and Toubia (2015), is that consumers view the offer as ―too good to 
be true‖, that is, they mistrust YK. But mistrust would not readily explain our other key 
results on availability and lack of persistence. First, it is silent on why availability increases 
demand and begs the question of why discount-driven mistrust would dissipate almost 
immediately after the campaign ends. Second, it is not clear why consumers would mistrust 
the overdraft interest discount but not other deep discounts that prevail in equilibrium, like 
―free‖ checking and teaser rates on credit cards. Third, a mistrust channel need not be distinct 
from the behavioral mechanisms described above; indeed, Johnson, Meier and Toubia (2015) 
find that some ―households expect there to be hidden fees and cumbersome processes that are 
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not compensated by the attractiveness of the offer.‖ Fourth, it is not clear why our sample 
consumers would respond by decreasing demand for overdrafts rather than simply ignoring 
the offer: do consumers assume that hidden costs exceed the value of the discount? Fifth, if 
YK’s clients did think that YK was trying to trick them, we might expect them to reduce their 
demand for other YK services. Yet we find no such evidence (see Appendix Table AII), and 
the point estimates of the effect of the overdraft discount on the number of active YK 
accounts are actually positive rather than negative. Sixth, several institutional differences 
between our experiment and Johnson, Meier and Toubia’s (2015) that make mistrust more 
important in their context. In particular, the offer in Johnson, Meier and Toubia (2015) was 
too good to be true in the sense of being government-subsidized, and that offer was made by 
a mortgage servicer at a time when the servicing industry was known to be mistreating and 
scamming customers (e.g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2013)).  
Rational inattention, and/or high search costs a la Ellison (2005), could explain our 
results, but under assumptions that strike us as antithetical to those sorts of models.  For 
example, instead of remembering new information, consumers quickly forget it. Perhaps 
more critically, instead of mean-zero but noisy perceptions of costs and credit lines, a rational 
checking account holder in our setting would need to systematically underestimate them. But 
does it make sense to think of consumers as rational if they hold biased perceptions of 
contract terms in equilibrium? Much of behavioral economics answers this question with an 
emphatic no - indeed, they draw the line between rational versus behavioral based on a 
distinction between mean-zero versus biased deviations from classical assumptions about 
decision-making. 
Relatedly, one could rationalize the bundled discount results as due to reduced attention 
costs more broadly, rather than to increased attention to add-on costs in particular, as the key 
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factor mediating consumer choices. Specifically, inducing use of auto-pay or debit cards 
could increase the customer’s engagement with the bank, thereby lowering costs of 
monitoring her cash flows, and reducing overdrafts.
18
 But messages that discount only the 
bundled products and do not mention overdraft do not reduce overdraft usage. Thus, the 
mechanism seems unlikely to hinge only on a (rational) increase in attention to the checking 
account more broadly. Some heightened awareness of add-on costs is likely key.  
Notwithstanding the above, we emphasize are not dismissing rational or near-rational 
explanations for our results. Rather, we are merely speculating that behavioral models of 
limited attention, memory, and shrouding have great potential to explain the full picture. 
V. Conclusion 
Working with a large Turkish bank to test SMS direct marketing promotions to 108,000 
existing checking account holders, we find that messages promoting a 50% discount on the 
overdraft interest rate reduce overdraft usage. In contrast, messages that mention overdraft 
availability without mentioning price increase usage. Neither change persists long, however, 
after messages stop. We also find some evidence that messaging intensity reinforces the main 
effects of overdraft discount and availability advertising—messaging more about the 
overdraft discount further reduces demand, while messaging more about overdraft 
availability further increases demand—and that messages offering discounts on debit card or 
auto-pay use along with overdraft backfire more than simply offering a discount on 
overdrafts. But not all discounts backfire: we find some evidence that debit card and auto-pay 
discounts increase usage of those features. 
                                                          
18
 This is akin to a lower Gabaix and Laibson-type ―substitution cost‖ of avoiding the add-on. 
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Our results suggest that competing on overdraft prices will not capture market share or 
increase usage and thus will lower revenue. Although cutting overdraft prices could in 
principle generate more customer loyalty or reciprocity, the fact that induced overdraft 
behavior does not persist suggests that these sorts of long-term benefits will not materialize 
for banks.  
More subtly, our results should give pause to third parties seeking to improve overdraft 
markets with messages (like social marketing campaigns) that draw attention to overdraft 
costs. To fix ideas, imagine messaging around the theme of ―Beware of big overdraft fees!‖ 
that is delivered by an entity that might benefit from unshrouding, for example, a regulator, a 
firm with social objectives or a product-differentiation strategy, or a personal financial 
management service. Our results are consistent with models of limited and reactive attention 
formalize the idea that consumer responses to unshrouding are overreactions rather than 
optimal responses to new information (e.g., Gabaix (2014), Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 
(2015)). Our results further suggest that unshrouding could be quite costly to sustain, since its 
effects do not persist and that incumbent suppliers could effectively counter unshrouding 
campaigns by advertising non price attributes (like availability/credit lines in our case). 
Accordingly, we are sympathetic to Heidhues, Köszegi, and Murooka’s (2017) conjecture 
that third parties, or deviating firms, will be outgunned in a messaging arms race with 
incumbent add-on suppliers. 
Although our results support policymakers’ increasing scrutiny of add-on features, 
pricing, and practices, we emphasize that we do not conduct the sort of welfare analysis that 
should motivate and guide policy interventions. One reason we stop short of welfare analysis 
is that we do not actually have the ability to sharply test existing models of shrouded 
equilibria, since our experiment considers the existing client base of a single firm rather than 
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competition for customers across firms (Armstrong and Vickers (2012), Gabaix and Laibson 
(2006), Grubb (2015), Heidhues, Köszegi, and Murooka (2017)).  
Future work would do well to focus on welfare, although doing so may require far more 
household-level consumption and expenditure data than are typically available in studies that 
rely on administrative data alone. Refining our design could also help test across models, for 
instance, by testing promotions that mention price without cutting it and by mentioning 
information on price levels as well as or instead of discounts. It would also be useful to 
examine consumer perceptions of add-on prices and expectations of usage more directly, 
given their centrality to theoretical assumptions and predictions.  
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Appendix: Additional Results 
[FIGURE AI: Distribution of Effect of Overdraft Mention and of Interest Discount] 
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Figure A1. Distribution of Effect of Overdraft Mention and of Interest Discount.  Panel A plots 
the marginal effects of a message mentioning the overdraft account on each quantile of overdraft 
account balance. Panel B plots the average marginal effects of an interest discount on each quantile of 
overdraft account balance. 
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